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NOTES
THE COMMUNITY SEGMENT IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS:
A DISSENTING ESSAY
THAT which is defamatory in the eyes of one segment of the population may
be laudatory in the eyes of another and a matter of complete indifference to a
third. In determining whether a false utterance can amount to defamation
per se, it is rare for a court to articulate its reasons for choosing one commu-
nity segment rather than another.' Yet this choice is one of the chief deter-
minants of liability.
The delimitation of a broad community from which a segment is to be
chosen may itself be subject to some judicial interpretation and misinterpreta-
tion.2 For example, it may be difficult to say precisely at what geographical
point it becomes defamatory to call a white man a Negro, although it is well
recognized that the actual effect varies from North to South.3 In the same way
it may be difficult to determine the exact point in time at which community
attitude toward Soviet Russia and communism changes, although the courts,
in determining the damaging effect of a charge of communism, have clearly
attempted to follow each swing of the public mind." It may be particularly
1. Usually it is possible to delineate the segment by quoting a string of terms im-
puting all virtue and knowledge to: "readers of reasonable understanding, discretion,
and candor," King v. Pillsbury, 115 Me. 528, 531, 99 Ati. 513, 514 (1917); "reasonable
and fair minded men," Sack v. New York Times Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup.Ct.1945),
aff'd, 270 App.Div. 401, 59 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dep't 1946).
2. "We are sensitive to the charge of murder only because our fellow s deprecate it
in most forms; but a headhunter, or an aboriginal American Indian, or a gangster woVuld
regard such an accusation as a distinction, and during the Great War an 'ace,' a man vho
had lilled five others, was held in high regard." L. Hand, J., in Burton v. Crowell
Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936). "In determining their actionable nature the
courts must, unless controlled by some settled precedent, decide in accordance with the
general and fixed current of opinion of the locality of publication.... Blcaue of this,
judicial decisions of the past are so apt to vary with social and moral %iews of the differ-
ent jurisdictions. . . ." Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 182, 146 So. 234, ,236 (1933).
"... [T]he courts are no longer on sure ground in this area.... No single normative
standard governs the community; it could be said that no community exdsts, but past,
present, even future communities tied together in a spatial bundle." Riesman, Demacracy
and Defamation, 42 CoL. L. Rnv. 1282, 1301 (1942).
3. Compare, e.g., Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S.. Ctil (1911) (spcial
damages must be proved), with May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671
(1910) (slander per se).
4. The Red Scare of the early 1920's produced several holdings that such a charge
was defamatory per se. Washington Times Co. v. Murray, 299 Fed. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1924) ;
Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926). But just before the Russo-German
pact it was held that so long as the Communist Party was a legal political party, an
accusation of membership was not defamatory per se. Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc.
315, 20 X.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup.Ct.1940). However, world communism quiddy came into
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awkward to delimit the community in space or time in the case of a highly
technical or specialized utterance: its effect, if any, may be limited to a com-
munity of professional men, whose characteristics may be largely outside com-
mon knowledge and experience. An example is Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing
Conmpany,5 where an article, falsely imputed to plaintiff, a lecturer on Pales-
tine, contained inaccuracies detectable only by another expert. In holding for
the plaintiff, the court assumed the significant community for the purpose of
the case to be composed of other experts on Palestine.
More usually, however, demarcation of a general community does not pre-
sent an articulated problem for court decision, and the principal choice to be
made is that of an intracommunity group whose esteem the plaintiff claims to
have lost.
The decisions reflect two approaches. One is to inquire whether plaintiff
has been damaged "in the minds of right-thinking persons."0 The emphasis is
usually on normalcy: the eccentric or "wrong-thinking" segments; albeit of
considerable size, are disregarded. Inherent in this standard is a quantitative
as well as an ethical element, for it seems assumed that "right-thinking" peo-
ple are in a majority.7 But to Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme
Court, liability was not "a question of a majority vote."8 By his view, it is
enough that plaintiff be lowered in the esteem of any substantial and respect-
able group, though a minority.
disrepute as Russia joined with the Nazis to divide Poland, and the communist label
again became legally damaging. Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup.
Ct. 1941). With the German attack on Russia, community feeling changed enough so
that no plaintiffs seemed to have had the temerity to ask damages for being called a
communist. The pendulum has since swung once more as post-war disillusionment has
replaced goodwill, and the courts again hold that a charge of being a communist is
libelous. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.1947) ; Wright v. Farm Journal, 158
F.2d 976 (2d Cir.1947) ; Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.1945);
Mencher v. Chesley, 186 Misc. 877, 61 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup.Ct.1946), aft'd, 297 N.Y, 94,
75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
An interesting analogy to the treatment of the accusation of communism is the line
of early British cases in which the alleged defamation consisted in calling a man a
"Papist." Such a charge was held not actionable when the Catholic James I was on the
throne. Ireland v. Smith, 2 Brownl. 166 (C.P. 1612). A contrary result was reached
during the reign of Protestant Charles II. Row v. Clarges, 3 Mod. 26 (K.B. 1684).
Libel was also found in such a charge during the period between the coronation of
James II and the ascension to the throne of William and Mary, Walden v. Mitchell, 2
Vent. 265 (C.P. 1694).
5. 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929).
6. See. e.g., Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal Ass'n, 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186
N.E. 217, 218 (1933).
7. "Words are not actionable as defamatory, however much they may damage a
man in the eyes of a section of the community, unless they also amount to disparagement
of his reputation in the eyes of right thinking men generally." Tolley v. Fry & Sons,
Ltd,, [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479.
8. See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
9. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th
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Essentially, the index groups indicated by these two tests differ only as to
number. Under either test the plaintiff cannot succeed in his defamation ac-
tion if the group in whose eyes he is injured is deemed not "substantial" 10 or
antisocial."1
Despite the usual insistence that plaintiff show damage in the qes of a siz-
able and a moral segment of the community, these requirements seem to have
been imposed largely through intuitive judicial reaction. They seem to have
escaped the analysis which they invite.
It may be taken as axiomatic that the social purpose underlying the action
Cir.1947); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.1945). It should b2
noted that there is a tendency on the part of a few courts to hold that a statement is
harmless when there are people who would not think less of plaintiff for entertaining
particular views. Where a school board president was quoted as saying: "W hy should
kids save .... let the government take care of them when they are old," the court said:
"We are unable to hold that in commenting upon such a question of public policy the in-
clusion of a statement attributing to a public official economic views of a sort which were
then held and accepted by a large part of our population is, in itself and per se," a libl.
Harris v. Curtis Pub. Co., 49 Cal.App2d 340, 347, 121 P.2d 761, 765 (1942) ; cf. Watlins
v. Augusta Chronicle Pub. Co., 49 Ga. App. 43, 174 S.E. 199 (1934) ; Sullivan v. Meyer,
91 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1937). The argument is a strange one. If damage has demonstra-
bly been done the plaintiff, should redress be denied because the damage was not greater?
10. R STATE-MENT, ToRTs § 559(e) (1938). Contra: Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 93 F2d
232 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (complaint based on accusation in presence of "at least one" other
person held sufficient to state a cause of action for slander per se.
11. Where plaintiff has a social "duty" to do what the false statement alleged he
had done, the courts may find no defamation, since no cne should think ill of him for
performing his obligation. E.g., Fey v. King, 194 Iowa 835, 190 N.W. 519 (1922) (a
charge that plaintiff had acted as a "crank" in reporting gambling at a county fair held
not defamatory per se) ; Connelly v. McKay, 176 Misc. 685,28 N.Y.S2d 327 (Sup.Ct.1941)
(see p. 1391 infra) ; Byrne v. Deane, 157 LT.R. 10 (C.A. 1937) (plaintiff charged with
being disloyal to his dub by reporting gambling).
Even when plaintiff has only a "right," courts sometimes find no defamation. Hollcn-
beck v. Hall, 103 Iowa 214, 72 NAV. 518 (1897) (an accusation that plaintiff "cowardly
slinks behind" the statute of limitations held not defamatory per se); Homer v. Engel-
hardt, 117 Mass. 539 (1879) (plaintiff charged with avoiding a just claim by setting up
a prohibitory liquor law as a defense).
See Riesman, mtpra note 2, at 1300: "[T]he courts have intrmduced into the
factual question of what is defamatory both their notions as to what ought to be defama-
tory and their judgments as to what ought to be done in the entire situation before them."
The courts are inconsistent in applying the doctrine, however. Consistent applica-
tion would require a nonsuit at least whenever the plaintiff was falsely accused of bdng
or doing something the legality of which is unquestioned. The courts hold contra in all
sorts of situations: for example, where a plaintiff recovers on a false accusation of being
a Negro. And see Stevens v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 214 Pac. 963 (1923) (an article charg-
ing plaintiff with changing the boundaries of a school district against the public interest,
held libelous although it was pointed out in defense that he had followed the legal pro-
cedure) ; Balabanoff v. Hearst Consolidated Pub., Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945)
(that the Cheka was a legal instrument of the government of a friendly power is no
defense for an accusation of membership in that organization) ; Dusabe: v. lMartz, 121
Okla. 241, 249 Pac. 145 (1926) (contemptuous article accusing plaintiff of vaiting to be
drafted instead of volunteering held libelous).
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for defamation is to protect members of society against irresponsible or mali-
cious utterances which are false and damaging to plaintiff's name.12 Unless
some extrinsic policy intervenes, then by definition the action should be avail-
able whenever the plaintiff's reputation has been disparaged by a false state-
ment, even in the extreme case where the esteem lost be that of but one man,
and he a moron, a lunatic, or a murderer. The twin quantitative and ethical
limitations developed by the courts, however, closely curtail the operation of
the basic policy of defamation law. What valid objectives justify these crip-
pling restrictions?
Something may be said for a numerical limitation. At the outset, it is clear
that administrative considerations must set a lower limit to the number of
men whose opinion may be deemed legally significant. If plaintiff is damaged
in the regard of only a very few, whose opinion is of no particular impor-
tance to him, the matter must be considered de inidmis. It woutd be adminis-
tratively impossible for the courts to give redress every time a gossip spreads
falsehood to a few acquaintances.'" But essentially this limitation turns upon
the significance of the damage done, and merely states the platitude that the
judiciary cannot concern itself with minor social frictions when serious
clashes abound. Where the index group, even if small, is of measurable size
or is highly important to the plaintiff, it would seem that its status as a minor-
ity in the community should be relevant only to the issue of damage and not
to the supportability of the complaint. 4
The same reasoning should apply whether or not damages are alleged and
proved. Where damages need not be proved, as in the case of libel'6 and a
few kinds of slander,' 6 the plaintiff must in any case adduce proof not only
of the defamatory utterance and its falseness, but also of the community seg-
ment affected thereby.' 7 The extent to which this group loses respect for him
and the monetary value of the loss is left to the imagination. The judge may
have difficulty in estimating the substantiality of the injury, as may the jury
in estimating damages, but their difficulties will be no greater if the group is a
small one, important to the plaintiff, than if it is large. The problem is one of
substantive injury, not of number. Even the Holmesian view, though certainly
a more sophisticated approach than the "majority" test, may sometimes be un-
justifiably restrictive in its emphasis upon "substantial" numbers.
The second requirement of both tests, that the index group involved be
12. See PRoSSER, TORTS 780 (1941).
13. It is not intended to suggest, of course, that all claims for defamation need be
large. As in other fields, plaintiff should have recourse to a small claims court where
there is little damage.
14. See Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 98 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
15. PRossEm, ToRTs 797 (1941). A few cases have held contra to the traditional
rule. E.g., Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400
(1936); Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 147, 137 S.W.2d 1110 (1940).
16. E.g., false imputations of crime, or loathsome disease, or reflections on profes-
sional reputation. See PRossER, TORTS 798-805 (1941).
17. PRossER, TORTS 810-14 (1941).
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"right-thinking" or "respectable", is even less explicable in terms of any defin-
able objective.
Interjection of judicial conceptions of what respectable and sound thinking
persons do, or should, think becomes highly significant when these conceptions
differ from those of the segment of the community whose esteem plaintiff
claims to have lost. Where the group under consideration approves of illegal
or antisocial acts, or the nonfeasance of judicially approved acts, the courts
have refused to recognize as legally damaging the factual injury caused by
the false utterance. The relatively recent case of Comnelicy v. McKa318 pro-
vides an excellent example. Defendant spread the false report that plaintiff,
operator of a gasoline station, was in the habit of informing on truck drivers
violating regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Understand-
ably, plaintiff's business suffered a decline. But the court held that the false
and injurious utterance could not be defamatory-for, after all, plaintiff was
merely charged with doing that which he had a duty to do.
The Connelley decision affords a good clue as to the extrinsic purpose which
courts intend to subserve by substituting their own standards for those of
plaintiff's community segment. To permit the injured plaintiff to recover
would, declared the court, "be contrary to the public interest, in that it would
penalize the law-abiding citizen and give comfort to the law violator. It would
impede law enforcement for the benefit of the anti-social."1 9 Few of the
decisions are so specific. Vague reference to "right-thinking men," "respect-
able members of the community," or "public policy" is more usual. - But the
drift of the opinions seems clear. The effect of a ruling permitting the plain-
tiff to prevail would in some way be conducive to illegality or immorality in
the community. So dangerous would be the impact that the factually injured
plaintiff must be sent away without redress, and the spreader of injurious false
rumor be dismissed scot-free. This notion, intuitively attractive, deserves scru-
tiny.
Let it be assumed that judicial opinions delivered in defamation litigation
are widely read and are important operative factors in determining social be-
havior. Let it also be assumed that the court's standards of right-thinking
represent a more desirable norm than the criteria of plaintiff's community.
Applying these assumptions to the Conmelley case as an example for analysis,
who will be affected by the opinion, and how?
The immediate and obvious effect of that decision is hardly desirable. The
fundamental purpose for which the defamation action has been made available
is violated. The defendant rumor monger has been openly encouraged to lie
and injure again. The plaintiff, returning empty-handed to his idle business,
is not apt to praise the fairness of a legal system which has denied him re-
covery merely because he has acted like millions of other non-informers. And
under our assumption of the significance of judicial opinions in shaping social
18. 176 Mlisc. 6S5, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup.CUl941).
19. Id. at 687, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
20. See cases cited note 11 mpra.
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behavior, society now knows that, as long as some laws are unpopular, a little
selection in falsehoods will enable one to ruin another with impunity, at least so
far as actions for defamation are concerned.21
It is apparently the feeling of the court that, in refusing relief to the plain-
tiff, it has struck a blow for the enforcement of ICC regulations, and that this
social interest outweighs the clearly unfortunate effects of the immediate deci-
sion.
Will the ICC now be flooded with informants? Henceforth, if X reports
truck drivers to the ICC, and to his detriment he is accurately rumored to be
an informer, he must bow to the defense of truth. If he does not report, and
is injured by false rumors that he has, he fails under the Connelley rule. Thus
the case provides a remarkable form of incentive to the performance of acts
considered desirable by the judiciary, for it says to prospectively defamed
plaintiffs: "Act as you will, for whether you behave as the law thinks you
should, or not, you may not win your suit." In sum, the opinion provides no
more than a sanctionless affirmation that the judiciary approves of the ICC""
This statement is hardly startling, scarcely apropos in the context of the legal
issue at bar, and certainly without sufficient significance to the ICC to justify
the undesirable results of the Connelley decision.
The negative form of statement in the Connelley opinion suggests, however,
that the court was persuaded less by the merits of its conclusion than by the
demerits of an opposite holding.
The favorable aspects of a contrary decision are apparent. The defendant
panderer of falsehoods must compensate for the injury he has done, The
plaintiff is not singled out from among 140 million other non-informers to
suffer a severe penalty unmentioned in the Interstate Commerce Act. Society
is warned that the law will punish those who injure others by untrue state-
ments.
The dire consequences-which are thought to overcome these benefits, and
to require the Connelley decision, can, at most, be two. If plaintiff is permitted
to prevail, the court will have "adopted" the standards of the antisocial; the
prestige of the judiciary will be jeopardized, and, indirectly, the ranks of the
non-informers will be swollen. Secondly, it might be argued that a holding
21. An alternative action would be for what is generally known as "disparagenent"
(other names, such as "injurious falsehood," are sometimes given to the tort) which
consists in publication of injurious falsehoods concerning plaintiff's property or business.
Special damages as to the monetary value of business loss must be alleged and proved
for the action. Whether, given proof of such damage, a court would still pose the ob-
jection raised in the Connelley case seems doubtful, but no cases on the matter seem to
have arisen. See, generally, Wham, Disparagement of Properly, 21 ILL. L. Rnv. 26
(1926); Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement? 24 AlINN, L. Rav. 625 (1940);
Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935). Where the
defamation is uttered by a competing businessman, it may of course be unfair competition
and actionable as such.
22. Other explanations are possible. It is conceivable that the courts feel that their
own approbation of an act offsets the disapproval of an unethical group.
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contrary to the Connelley decision would establish a rule of law tending di-
rectly to discourage informing the ICC.
The vagueness of the first contention, explicitly relied upon by the Connelky
court, is so extreme that an answer is difficult to formulate. But even within
the framework of our initial assumption that judicial decisions are vital fac-
tors in shaping social action, it is difficult to see why a judgment for plaintiff
must discredit the judiciary and indirectly lead to an increase in the practice
decried. In the first place the court would not be "adopting" as its own the
standards of an antisocial group. Recognition of fact is not approval of princi-
ple. To refuse to recognize in a court of law that many citizens are not fond
of informers is to play legal ostrich.P
Further, as the analysis above indicates, denial of plaintiff's claim in the
Connelley case yielded no benefits to the ICC other than a sanctionless generali-
zation of approval. A court could offer precisely the same exhortation-
with equal effect-without imposing upon plaintiff the weight of judicial dis-
favor of the opinions and actions of others. An opinion permitting recovery
but decrying the social ethics of the community would thus entail equal bene-
fits for the ICC, meager though they may be, without the obvious dravbacks
of the Connelley decision.
Extreme examples can be imagined in which a judgment for plaintiff might
be shocking to many. Take the case of a murderer whose mobster pals snub
him because of a false report that he failed to get his man. Assuming the un-
likely situation that a criminal would seek to identify himself as the perpetrator
of such an offense, any court would presumably refuse its aid, in the name of
"public policy." Ordinarily, however, recovery at law should not be denied
solely on the ground of plaintiff's misconduct. In the Connelley case, where theplaintiff merel.y failed to inform, the court avoided such a holding, preferring
the ground that plaintiff must lose because others think and act undesirably.
And even if plaintiff's conduct had been actively illegal, it would not follow
that he should fail in his defamation action. In most cases, in fact, a nonsuit
would be inappropriate as a punishment for plaintiff's unrelated wrong.
As to the second contention which might militate against reversing the
Connelley holding, would a court holding for plaintiff establish a rule of
law operating directly to discourage informers? There would still be no
23. The objection is in no v.-ay to the substitution of judicial conceptions of morality
for those of the market place. Such elevation of standards perhaps forms one of the
great functions of the judiciary. Exception here is taken rather to the unreasoned mis-
application of notions of social ethics. The Comielley court apparently conceived the
issue to be the difficult one of choosing between promoting defamation law and suppart-
ing the ICC. The issue is not actually raised, and the court's conclusion succeeds only
in confounding one valid policy without benefiting the other.
It might be pointed out, moreover, that the social group most pleased at the out-
come of the Connelley decision may be the antisocial group to whom the court most
expressly desires not to "give comfort." To the extent that they remain convinced that
plaintiff did in fact inform as he was reported to have done, the undesirable commu-
nity element -will rejoice at the further loss which he has suffered.
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positive incentive to act desirably, for the defense of truth bars any re-
covery if plaintiff actually reported to the ICC.2 4 If he did not report vio-
lations, however, and is factually damaged by the false rumor, he will win
under a rule contra to the Connelley decision. The lesson of the latter
rule, on its face, seems socially undesirable: "Act repyehensibly (do iot in-
form), for if, to your detriment, you are then falsely rumored to have acted
desirably (informed), you may win your defamation suit."
Thus it is possible, by fine-spun logic, to arrive at an extrinsic policy for
denying plaintiff's recovery, although such was not the policy which led to the
court's decision. But will the policy in fact be furthered? Are our initial as-
sumptions made as to the effect of a court opinion supportable? Clearly they
are unwarranted. Even if it be assumed, as it sometimes must, that the public
knows the law, in the situation under discussion such knowledge cannot affect
behavior, for the operation of the law is here only remotely concerned with
the act done. Men do not and cannot plan their action or inaction for the pur-
pose of creating a cause of action in defamation in the event that someone
subsequently makes a false statement about them. The possibility of such a
statement is a chance that must always be present, regardless of the course of
action taken. A defamation decision may have great force as a precedent im-
peding or furthering the social purpose of defamation law; as a sanction for
extrinsic objectives, its effect is a nullity.
Defamation law is tort law, with compensation for damage its sanction and
remedy. It is not relevant, except in the de inininis case, that the damage is
less than it would have been had the community segment been larger, or the
group homogeneous. Nor is it pertinent that the damage was greater than it
would have been had the community segment held different, albeit more desir-
able, views. No extrinsic consideration is properly involved; factual determi-
nation of the degree of injury caused by the falsehood should alone concern
the court.
24. In a few states, whose statutes or case law require that truth must be coupled
with good motives for the defendant to escape liability, (see Ray, Trulih: A Defense to
Libel, 16 MINx. L. Ray. 43 (1931)) the opposite result would presumably be reached,
Here, in fact, may be a case par excellence where plaintiff should be compensated for
the disparaging remarks, despite their veracity.
Usually, where the utterance is true, the plaintiff is the reprehensible party, and
notoriety is a punishment to him which may be deserved and may be public service. Here,
however, the plaintiff is one with standards higher than his community and higher than
those of his accuser. He certainly deserves no punishment, and the agitation of public
opinion against him is the reverse of a benefit to society. Only the policy in favor of
free dissemination of all truth in all cases would tend against his recovery, although
this might well be considered compelling.
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